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Abstract—Modern operating systems use a number of different
techniques and mechanisms to improve system throughput and
performance. But some of these optimizations can passively leak
crucial side-channel information regarding sensitive data that is
being processed and stored in the system. In this paper, we talk
about one such optimization mechanism prevalent in modern
Linux based operating systems, called page frame cache, which
is an integral part of physical memory allocation subsystem. It
is a purely software cache storing the page frames that are
recently being released by the process or processes running
on the corresponding CPU. We show that an adversary can
force the kernel to allocate specific page frames to a victim
process, running on the same CPU. We also discuss about
the possibility of a practical scenario where the adversary can
conduct Rowhammer attack to induce bit flips in the victim’s
page using only user level privilege.
Index Terms—page frame cache, rowhammer, buddy allocator,
zone allocator, physical memory allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Operating Systems are low-level system software that act
as an intermediary between the user applications and the
underlying computer hardware. Modern operating systems are
highly optimized for better performance, efficiency and secu-
rity. To increase the efficiency of the system and also to make
it programmer-friendly, modern operating systems employ
virtual memory management technique. Since its inception,
virtual memory has been an integral part of most operating
systems. In virtual memory based operating systems, the
address space is broken into fixed-sized intervals called pages
and essentially mapped into physical page frames. Physical
memory allocation is another important constituent of the
virtual memory subsystem. When a program is executed, the
operating system creates a special environment for the program
to run. This environment contains all the necessary things for
the system to run and gives an illusion to the program such
that it is the only process running in the system. The OS kernel
then allocates some memory for the program. The process of
memory allocation is handled by different memory allocators
of the kernel. The performance of a computer system largely
depends on how efficiently the dynamic memory allocation is
handled. In other words, how efficiently the process of virtual
to physical address translation mechanism and the memory
allocation is managed by the kernel plays an important role in
determining the performance of the system.
As operating systems have evolved over the years to provide
enhanced performance and security, the hardware components
of computer systems have equally ushered through a series
of technological advancement. The Dynamic Random Access
Memory, one of the most essential component of a computer,
have been constantly scaled down to accommodate larger
number of memory cells into smaller physical space, thereby
reducing the cost-per-bit of memory. However, cramming
a large number of DRAM cells in small space leads to
electromagnetic coupling effects among themselves, resulting
in bit flips [1]. This phenomenon is termed as Rowhammer
where repeated access to a particular row in DDR3 DRAM
chips can induce bit faults in adjacent rows. The authors [1]
accessed a sequence of memory locations and after every
access, flushed the contents from cache so that all the accessed
are served from the DRAM only. They observed that due
to their closely packed architecture, a bit flip can occur in
adjacent rows, even if those locations might not be accessible
to the attacker. This discovery brought in light some serious
security vulnerabilities on most of the commercial DRAM
chips which have been in use for so many years and paved the
way for further investigations and research. Soon researchers
came up with practical implementations of Rowhammer where
they induced bit flips to gain kernel privileges [2], escape from
sandbox environment [2], gain access to remote system via
Javascript enabled websites [3], obtain hypervisor privilege in
cross-VM setting [4], etc. In recent years, a number of work
has been proposed which discusses about different methods to
conduct Rowhammer in various environments [5]–[7]. In [8],
the authors combined Rowhammer with a well known Prime
+ Probe attack to induce bit flips in the secret exponent of
public key crytposystem.
In this paper, we present a new method of conducting
Rowhammer on a specific page using the property of page
frame cache. We provide a brief background on virtual mem-
ory and physical memory in section II and III respectively.
In section IV, we present a detailed analysis on the current
allocation schemes that are used in Linux operating sys-
tem. We exploit the page frame cache in section V, used
in modern Linux based operating systems, to strategically
force the operating system to place sensitive data into pre-
defined pages in memory which are known to be vulnerable
to Rowhammer attack to the adversary. These pages, when
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subjected to Rowhammer attack (discussed in section VI),
can induce bit faults in the secret data which can be further
exploited using sophisticated fault analysis techniques.
II. BACKGROUND
The virtual memory subsystem is one of the most important
components of memory management in Linux based operating
systems. It allows the separation of logical memory as per-
ceived by the user from the actual physical memory. Virtual
memory creates an abstraction between the user and system
where the programs are no longer limited by the amount
of physical memory in the system. It is achieved through a
combination of group of fixed-length linear addresses, called
pages and address translation hardware which converts logical
addresses generated by the processor to physical address in the
underlying computer system. The operating system logically
partitions the entire physical main memory into fixed-length
page frames such that each page fits into a page frame. The
mapping from virtual memory to physical memory is stored
in special data structures called page tables. These are multi-
level tables are stored in physical memory and readable by the
translation hardware.
Modern CPUs operate much faster than the main memory
unit (typically DRAM) associated with it. Thus processor
speed is somewhat limited by the memory access speed -
a paradigm known as memory wall. This limitation was
mitigated to a large extent by bringing a small and very high
speed cache memory, in between the processor and the main
memory and using sophisticated algorithms to avoid cache
misses. However, with the ever increasing size of the operating
system and the number of applications running on them simul-
taneously, these highly efficient cache processing technologies
soon became insufficient to provide high performance. With
the advent of multi-processor systems, this problem became
more prominent because now only one processor can access
the memory at any point of time, making a lot of processes
to starve.
Non Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) attempts to address
this problem in multi-processor system by providing separate
memory for each processor, thus avoiding the degradation in
performance when multiple processors are trying to access
memory simultaneously. In modern machines, memory is
organised into banks that incur different access time depending
on its relative distance from the processor.
III. PHYSICAL MEMORY
DRAM typically constitutes the main memory of a mod-
ern computer. The memory controller is connected with the
motherboard via slots called channels. Each DRAM card is
a circuit board consisting of physical memory modules called
Dual Inline Memory Module which further consists of one or
more rank. Each rank is comprises of multiple banks, generally
8 in number. Each bank is a group of DRAM cells arranged
in a two-dimensional structure in rows and columns.
In NUMA based systems, each bank is called a node and
each node is divided into a number of blocks called zone.
Linux uses a node-local allocation policy when allocating
page to processes such that the memory is allocated from the
node closest to the CPU running the program [9]. Inside a
node, page frame is the primary unit for all types of memory
allocations - storing kernel data, user information, buffering
disk data and so on. In order to enforce constraints on storing
page frames for different purposes, the physical memory
in each node is divided into three zones - ZONE_DMA,
ZONE_NORMAL, ZONE_HIGHMEM in case of 32 bit archi-
tectures and ZONE_DMA, ZONE_DMA32, ZONE_NORMAL
in case of 64 bit architectures. Each zone type is suitable for
specific purpose; however, they can be used for other purposes
as well depending on the situation.
• ZONE DMA. First 16MB of physical memory. Mainly
used to allocate pages for DMA capable devices in both
32 bit and 64 bit architectures.
• ZONE DMA32. This zone exists only in 64 bit systems.
The memory ranges from 16MB to 4GB. This zone can
be used for both DMA operations and normal operations.
• ZONE NORMAL. On 64 bit systems, this zone com-
prises everything beyond 4GB, while on 32 bit system,
it is from 16MB to 896 MB containing normal, regularly
mapped pages.
• ZONE HIGHMEM. This zone is only present in 32
bit systems ranging from 896MB to the end. It usually
contains highmemory, which are temporarily mapped
pages in kernel address space.
IV. MEMORY ALLOCATION SCHEMES
When kernel invokes an allocation mechanism to request
pages, it must specify the zone from where it expects the
page frame to come from. Of course, if the request cannot
be satisfied by the preferred zone, the allocation function
will try to get the page frames from other zones in order
as maintained in zonelist. However, all the requested page
frames must come from a single zone. If none of the memory
zones have sufficient pages, the kernel awakens the kswapd
to free up pages from zones. The allocation requests for a
group of contiguous page frames is handled by the zoned page
frame allocator. The zone allocator selects the zone which
can satisfy the request for contiguous page frames. Inside
each zone, the allocation is handled by the core allocator for
Linux, called Buddy allocator. In this allocation scheme, the
pages are clustered into large blocks of size in power of two.
When a request for certain amount of memory comes from
the processor, the algorithm first searches the blocks of pages
to check if the request can be met. If no blocks of pages are
found to meet the demand, block of the next size is split into
half and one half is allocated to the requesting process. The
two smaller blocks thus produced are called buddies to each
other. The process of splitting a block into half continues until
a block of desired size is obtained. Figure 1 shows the working
principle of buddy allocation scheme. When the allocated
block becomes free, the buddy block is also examined. If both
are free, they are merged together and returned back to their
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Fig. 1: Buddy Allocation Scheme [9]
original block size. The coalescing of blocks on deallocation
gives rise to the name of the allocation scheme. The kernel
will try to merge pairs of free buddy blocks of size if both
are of same size and located in contiguous memory. The main
advantage of buddy system is that the address of the buddy of
a free block can be easily calculated from the address for the
free block, making it easier and efficient to implement.
Frequent allocation and deallocation of blocks of contiguous
memory can leave “holes” in the memory - a phenomenon
known as external fragmentation. Buddy Allocation system
helps in avoiding this situation. Suppose, a program requests a
group of page frames for 1 MB memory. The buddy allocation
algorithm first checks the list for 28 page block. If no such
free block is found, it checks the block for 29 and so on.
If such a block exists, it splits the block in half; one half is
allocated to the process requesting the memory and the other
half is added to the list of 28 page block. Similarly, when the
process deallocates the memory, the algorithm searches for its
buddy and if free, coalesces and adds the block into 29 page
block list.
The kernel maintains a per-CPU page frame cache for
each memory zone. This small software cache of recently
deallocated (released) page frames are used by the Buddy
allocator if the local CPU requests a small amount of memory,
typically a few pages. The page frame cache is maintained for
each CPU inside each zone. The presence of page frame cache
can significantly boost up the system performance. Figure 2
shows the components of Linux page frame allocator for x86-
64 machine.
V. EXPLOITING PAGE FRAME CACHE
When an application requests memory, the kernel first
invokes the zone allocator which in turn invokes the buddy
allocator to satisfy the request. During the course of running
of the application, it might request and/or release memory
dynamically which must be serviced by the buddy allocator.
Based on the principle of locality of reference, Linux uses
per-CPU based page frame cache to hold some of the recently
deallocated page frames. The cache is specific to the node and
thereby the CPU on which the application is running. If the
same program requests some page, it can be serviced from
the page frame cache, thereby boosting the performance of
the system. However, the page frame cache can be used by an
adversary, operating in a multi-user environment, to force the
kernel to allocate sensitive data of other user or processes, in
some specific physical page frame.
Suppose, a program is running on a 64-bit x86 machine.
It first requests a large amount of memory using mmap. The
request is passed on to the zone allocator by the kernel which
selects the zone from the zonelist. The buddy allocator scans
the list of page frame blocks and finds out a block that
can satisfy the request. It must be noted that the program
must store some data into the allocated pages, otherwise
the physical page frames will not be allocated. Now, the
program deallocates a page by using the function unmmap.
The unmapped page will reside in the page frame cache of the
zone and corresponding to the CPU on which the program is
currently running. If the same program requests for additional
memory during the course of its execution, the kernel will
try to serve the page frames from the cache, if the request is
small and can be satisfied by the cache; else, it will invoke
the buddy allocator once more. So, with a probability of
almost 1, if the process requests for a few pages, the recently
deallocated page frames will be reallocated, along with other
page frames. The situation becomes interesting when there
is another process running simultaneously on the system and
sharing the same CPU. Once again we have a process running
on the system which allocates a large memory, unmaps one
or two pages and waits. It must be mentioned here that the
adversarial process must remain active rather than going into
inactive state (sleeping), since in that case the entire process
state information including page frame cache will be swapped
out of memory. Now, if a process, more generally a victim
process, running on the same CPU requests some memory,
the kernel will first try to service the request from the page
frame cache itself. Thus, the page frame that was unmapped
by the adversarial process gets allocated to the victim process.
Fig. 2: Components of Zoned Page Frame Allocator in Linux [10]
VI. THE THREAT: ROWHAMMER
Rowhammer has been used as a tool to break different
security primitives imposed by the operating system. Some
of the attacks have already been discussed in section I. It
is a phenomenon observed in DRAM chips due to electrical
interaction between adjacent cells. An attacker cannot control
the location or frequency of getting bit flips using Rowhammer
unless she is CAP SYS ADMIN capable. If an adversary
have access to pagemap, she can get the page frame num-
ber (PFN) of the target page. However, “since Linux 4.0,
only users with the CAP SYS ADMIN capability can get
PFNs” [11]. In practical scenario, an attacker might not have
CAP SYS ADMIN privilege to precisely identify the location
of sensitive user data and perform double sided Rowhammer
to induce faults. However, using the page frame cache as a side
channel, the attacker can substantially increase his chances of
successfully conducting a Rowhammer attack.
An adversary having only user level privilege can conduct
Rowhammer without any additional pagemap information.
Ofcourse, the bit flips, if any, will be uncontrolled and does
not guarantee any meaningful exploitation. The attacker first
allocates a large memory space (typically 1 GB) and starts
the Rowhammer process. After getting a bit-flip, she unmaps
the corresponding page frame using unmmap. This is possible
since the unmmap function takes the virtual address of the
starting of a page as an argument. After unmapping, the
process waits (in active mode) for the victim. The unmapped
page frame can be considered as “vulnerable” to Rowhammer
as it contains a memory cell susceptible to bit-flips. This page
will be stored in the page frame cache until it is assigned
again to some process. The victim, operating on the same
CPU, requests for memory in order to store some data. If
the request for memory is small (a few pages), the kernel
will try to allocate page frames from the cache itself. After
some time, the adversary starts hammering once again in her
virtual address space. We have observed that there is a high
probability of getting bit flips in the same location when
conducting Rowhammer on the same virtual address space.
Based on this observation, we can say that the adversary might
be able to induce bit flips once more in the same page that
now holds the victim data.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Linux kernel uses a number of optimization techniques
to enhance the performance and efficiency of the underlying
hardware. Dynamic memory allocation is one of the most
important feature, which can seriously affect the performance
if not handled properly. The Linux kernel uses Zone Allocator
and Buddy Allocator together to allocate the physical memory
to all the user and kernel processes. For better performance
and efficiency, every memory zone is associated with a per-
CPU page frame cache that can hold a small number of page
frames that are recently been released by a running process.
In this paper, we observe that every CPU in the system has
a page frame cache and it can be exploited to force the
kernel to assign pages which are susceptible to Rowhammer
to an unaware victim process. All the reported attacks on
Rowhammer either targets a large address space, or uses
pagemap information to attack specific memory location.
Using the page frame cache, we argue that it is possible
to perform targetted Rowhammer on very small amount of
data (as small as a single page) without having any special
privilege. The same attack methodology can be used to target
cryptographic implementations and induce persistent faults
[12] which can be exploited offline to eventually extract key
information.
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